Estimating Ideal Points from UN General Assembly Sponsorship Data

Executive Summary

Problem and purpose

Research on state preferences in the United Nations General Assembly often relies on roll-call votes. The problem is that this focus leaves aside a large share of the Assembly's institutional output. The article proposes using sponsorship and co-sponsorship of resolutions as an alternative source for inferring state preferences.

Approach and data

The research note applies ideal point estimation to UN General Assembly sponsorship data for all member states from 2009 to 2019. The approach observes alliances and proximities before the final vote, focusing on the stage in which states support, co-sponsor or associate themselves with disputed proposals.

Main findings

The results identify a substantive dimension with external validity, associated with states' orientation toward multilateralism. The article shows that sponsorship information is not merely administrative noise: it captures meaningful political patterns and complements traditional vote-based measures.

Contribution

The work expands the methodological repertoire for studying international politics at the UN. By shifting attention from voting to the process through which resolutions are built, it allows researchers to infer preferences from a broader set of information and with less dependence on final voting outcomes.